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Huebner's Heidegger: Toward an Authentic Conception of Learning and "Historicity" for Contemporary Education

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1. Introducing the Topic: Reading Huebner's "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality"

This essay interprets the concepts that Dwayne Huebner originally adopted in his curriculum philosophy by examining, "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," a groundbreaking essay that introduced phenomenology to curriculum studies in the late 1960s (Pinar, 1992). The concepts that Huebner incorporates emerge directly from Heidegger's philosophy, e.g., the phenomenological fundamental-ontology of Dasein as well as themes arising from Heidegger's later writings of the "Turn" (*Kerhe*). It is evident that Huebner's purpose is to inspire thinking on education in a new direction by turning to the philosophy of Heidegger and the phenomena of "temporality" and "historicity." However, as Huebner (1999a) explicitly states, "I do not intend or propose to provide either a presentation or an interpretation of this phenomenological ontology as he develops Dasein's temporality" (136). As a result, crucial aspects of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, while certainly *thought-through* by Huebner, remain *unsaid* because they are neither explicated nor formally developed.

In what follows, using Huebner's work as a springboard, I formalize the crucial role Heidegger's philosophy plays in inspiring Huebner's reconceived understanding of the curriculum along with speculating on the potential impact this philosophy has for a reinterpretation and reevaluation of our conceptions of knowledge, students, and learning.

By tracing Huebner's curriculum philosophy back to its origin, in relating his language and concepts to a unique way of *naming* the truth of our historical Being as related to our educational practices, I hope to demonstrate several ways that educators might draw inspiration from Huebner's reconceived understanding of education. The authentic understanding of education, emerging from Huebner's critical encounter with Heidegger, holds the promise to enlighten and inspire educators in the direction of understanding, interpreting, and discoursing with and about students in terms of their own potentiality-for-Being as grounded in the unfolding and the enactment of their historical reality. For both thinkers, it is the authentic understanding of time (*temporality*) and history (*historicity*) that inspires the unique possibilities for human transcendence and potential educational reform.

2. Huebner's Authentic View of Education Through Heidegger's Conceptual Lens: The Phenomenological Concern with Temporality and Historicity

A. Deconstructing the Tradition in Education

Huebner's (1999a) work in the phenomenology aims to rethink and ultimately redefine the categories of goals, purposes, and learning in education, which according to Huebner, have been, and continue to be, misunderstood by educational professionals to the detriment of students. Goals

and purposes in education, when conceived in an inauthentic manner, relate exclusively to the future development of the student, where the "educator looks ahead to expected outcomes, plans for tomorrow, and attempts to specify the future behavior of the student," in terms that are precise and unambiguous (132). The category of learning, as "learning theory" employed by advocates of social efficiency, is concerned primarily with behavioral science. This view to education ominously equates "learning" with "the change in behavior of an organism" (Ibid., 132). Social efficiency educators are also primarily concerned with one type of learning, or way of knowing the world, namely, an objective form of calculative knowledge associated with the process of abstract generalization (ibid., 133). In this form of knowing, "certain patterns, assumed to exist in the object world, are abstracted by the individual and carried into new situations" (Ibid., 135). This engenders the mistaken notion that learning transpires within the individual, leading to the erroneous conclusion that there is "the individual and there is the world, and that the individual develops in such a way that he has power over the world or to act upon the world. Such thinking leads to the consideration of the individual as something distinct" (Ibid., 134-135).

Huebner's critique of learning in education can be traced to both Heidegger's early critique of knowledge in *Being and Time* and his later philosophy relating to the problem of technology. Heidegger's philosophy addresses (1) the problematic notion that all viable learning is reducible to abstract conceptualization, or scientific *thematizing - calculative thought* as described by Heidegger – valued for its use in mastering objective, empirical reality, which is a view to knowledge grounded in (2) the problematic Cartesian understanding of the human as an interiorized subject who resides at a metaphysical and epistemological remove from the objective world. As Heidegger (1962) indicates, when we approach entities in the world in terms of representing abstract scientific-mathematical relationships, we reduce them to a mere *present-at-hand* existence, or as Heidegger states, "Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more," and such entities, in a pejorative sense, have their "properties defined mathematically in 'functional concepts'" (122/88). This is what Heidegger refers to as the *impoverished Cartesian world*, which is sharply contrasted with the *world* in its authentic ontological-existential manifestation, which is linked with the *worldhood* of Dasein. The Cartesian "world" represents an "ontical concept and signifies the totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world" as objects situated in time-space (Ibid., 93/64).

It is possible to articulate Huebner's phenomenological project in terms of what Heidegger (1982) calls Destruktion (deconstruction), which represents the "critical process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be applied are de-constructed down to the sources from which they are drawn" (23). As Thomson (2005) points out, in his analysis of Heidegger and ontological education, we must "reject the polemical reduction of 'deconstruction' (Destruktion) to 'destruction' (Zerstorung)" (141). Rather, Destruktion as employed by Heidegger (1962) is an attempt to reveal and grant access to "those primary 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn" (43/21). The tradition, be it metaphysics or historical institutions such as education, tends to cover over and obscure the primal sources that surge beneath it. When the tradition, or past, is accepted prima facie in an uncritical manner there is the danger that we are unable to return to the past in an authentic manner to reassess it and reinterpret it in light of our ontological potential for future change. When the past is conceived in an inauthentic manner, as either a point in time that is irretrievably gone or the locus of venerable and unquestioned traditions, "Dasein no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own" (Ibid., 43/21).

What I have outlined above represents the concern for the loss of an ontological sense of meaning through a fundamental covering over, or obscuring of, the issue of *temporality*, which is central to understanding Dasein's authentic "historizing" in the temporal "moment of vision"

(Augenblick). In Heidegger's (1962) fundamental ontology it is the "horizon" of time (temporality) that makes possible any understanding of Dasein's Being, and the notion of a horizon, or "horizonal schema," represents the boundary zone or limit within which our entire world manifests its presence in ways that are truly meaningful (Ibid., 416-417/365). Huebner also embraces this notion of the "horizon" of time (temporality) first making possible any authentic understanding of the human and the processes of its historical development. This is evident as Huebner (1999a) laments the educator's loss of the "basic awareness of historicity" as he urgently works to deconstruct and reinterpret traditional categories of "goals," "purposes," and "learning" as conceived within social efficiency. For as Huebner reasons, the "unquestioned acceptance" of the traditional definition and implementation of these categories "is one reason why the curriculum person has failed to generate the ideas necessary to keep educational institutions and the language abreast of the times" (132). By means of deconstructing the language and concepts of the tradition in education and curriculummaking, Huebner (1999a) concludes, in Heideggerian fashion, that if we approach the understanding of education's goals, purposes, and learning from an ontological perspective, as opposed to reducing and restricting them to the realm of epistemology (i.e., knowledge theory as related to cognitive and behavioral science), they point directly to "man's temporality and the concern for it as the focus of curricular action" (132).

B. The Individual-World Dialectic and the Authentic Notion of Learning as Existential Understanding

Huebner's concern with temporality is far more complex than simply the issue of educators, who are designing and implementing curriculum, demonstrating a concern for the unfolding of time, or taking an interest in history as a dynamic process, for these are concerns for *historicist* critique, and this is not what Huebner is engaged in. *Historicist* critique harbors the potential danger of devolving into a form of determinism, or worse, fatalism, where human agency is lost amidst a myriad of complex power structures and relations. In such a view, education as an institution of learning does not merely reflect the ideas and beliefs of society, it is determined and shaped by them; education, and along with it human subjectivity, is historically determined by political, economic, and institutional forces beyond the autonomous control of the individual.

Against this model, Huebner (1999a), on a primordial and ontological level, is concerned with *how* we enact our authentic existence in terms of the authentic unfolding of history in terms of a dialectic interchange between the human and its world, where education is envisioned as the "manifestation of the historical process, meshing the unfolding biography of the individual with the unfolding history of his society" (139). In addition, he is concerned with *how* our views of education might be enhanced when informed by the types of ontological-existential issues that emerge from Heidegger's philosophy, which might contribute to the authentic understanding and enactment of both the students' and educators' *Being-in-the-world* as *Being-with-Others*.

According to Huebner (1999b), "Curricular practice is not simply the concern for the constellation of the educative environment," more importantly, it is the "concern for the human events that occur within that environment" (225). To fully grasp the significance of the *individual-world dialectic*, Huebner's notion of educational "practice" must be elucidated in terms of practical human activity, which dynamically embodies the "essential temporal nature of man" as linked to history as a "major educational concern" (Ibid., 225). Ultimately, it is the notion of the *individual-world dialectic* that serves as Huebner's organizing philosophical force for reconceived curriculum design and is inspired by Heidegger's notions of *ecstatic temporality* and *historicity*. Analyzing the *individual-world dialectic* will reveal the kinship between Huebner's philosophy of education and

Heidegger's fundamental ontology, allowing for the elucidation and formalization of the manifold Heideggerian concepts at work below the surface of Huebner's phenomenological analysis of education. I begin by unpacking the following quotation by Huebner (1999a), which reveals that his understanding of the *individual-world dialectic* springs from the founding ground of Heidegger's thinking on the basic and interconnected themes of *temporality* and *historicity*:

The springs or sources of temporality do not reside in the individual, but in confrontation between the individual and other individuals, other material objects, and other ways of thinking as they are objectified in symbol and operation. Furthermore these springs or sources, although again not residing in society, are nevertheless unveiled, maintained, and protected by society. Thus man shapes the world, but the world also shapes man. This is the dialectical process in which cause is effect, and effect is cause. The world calls forth new responses from the individual, who in turn calls forth new responses from the world (137-138).

The dialectic as referenced above is neither Socratic nor Hegelian in nature, rather it represents the historical working out of our collective fates, or better, the ecumenical enactment of our destiny. Specifically, the individual-world dialectic unfolds in terms of the temporal activity of "historizing," which is the moment of actualization, in the present "moment of vision," of the individual's ontological potential understood in terms of historicity, or the potential to openly and resolutely project one's authentic and owned possibilities, gathered from its individual/communal past, or thrown-having-been, into the future as authentic possibility. Within the process of authentically enacting historical Being the "world responds by withholding or giving, yielding or resisting, punishing or criticizing, and supporting or negating" (Ibid., 137). According to Huebner, the responsibility of the authentic educator is actually twofold, and amounts to: (1) planning the environmental design of the curriculum so that it embodies the dialectical relationships that are at work and are valued within society, and this environment expresses the "concern for the temporality and historicity of man and society" while simultaneously "encouraging the moment of vision, where the past and future are the horizons of the individual's present so that his own potentiality for being is grasped"; and (2) planning the environmental design of the curriculum to include the traditions of the past comprising the heritage, or "collective wealth" of the society of which the educational system is a manifestation, for importantly, the "past becomes the means by which the individual can project his own potentiality for being" (Ibid., 138-139).

It is important to clarify Huebner's notion of authentic learning, which as opposed to learning grounded in abstraction and generalization, is a more primordial form of knowledge, or better, understanding through which students and educators interpret the world in meaningful ways. The reliance on learning through abstraction and inductive generalizations permeates the field of education, and there is the danger, as earlier outlined in relation to Heidegger, that when we approach entities, or human beings, in the world in terms of representing abstract scientific-mathematical relationships, we reduce them to a mere *present-at-hand* existence. We strip them of their ontological significance as temporal and historical beings. Huebner (1999c) is critical of equating abstract conceptualization with "authentic" learning in the curriculum, and in a deconstructive move echoing Heidegger, Huebner links the drive in education to privilege this form of calculative knowledge above other modes of world-disclosure directly to the loss of *temporality*. To conceive of objective knowledge as standing beyond the individual, capturing the so-called "real world" in veritable, irrefutable propositions, gives the false impression that the world is "relatively stable in time" (39). Huebner, making the case for multiple forms of knowledge in the curriculum, argues that as opposed to seeking knowledge that is immutable and beyond all change, which might

be acquired from the "perspective of nowhere" (*sub specie aeternitas*), educators "would do well to conceptualize change as the one constant thing and consistency as that which needs explanation" (Ibid., 39).

Authentic learning for both Huebner and Heidegger represents activities whereby we deepen our understanding of the world. Analyzing this form of meaningful insight, which is refined through interpretation, will reveal for the reader the relational character of human existence in terms of Huebner's understanding of the individual-world dialectic, which is at once the temporalhistorical happening of our Being, comprising the totality of the environmental design of the curriculum. For Huebner (1999a), the environmental design structuring the curriculum, which engenders authentic learning, embodies the ontological "reinterpretation of the significance of the categories of purpose and learning in education" (139). As related to Heideggerian thought, it represents the context, or "horizonal schema," associated with temporality and the enactment of all Dasein's authentic possibilities, which might be understood in terms of the individual's projection of the past into the indeterminate future, or as Huebner writes, "onto a present to create the 'moment of vision," which is the authentic appropriation and enactment of the individual's historical Being-in-the-world (Ibid., 139). This context, conceived in terms of what Heidegger calls Dasein's referential totality, gives meaning to the Dasein's life, and it is also Dasein's authentic world. Dasein, the only entity for whom Being is an issue, navigates this world by means of interpreting, discoursing, and understanding the possibilities and situations that are unique to it.

For Heidegger, understanding is both know-how and projection, or the manner in which Dasein, in its understanding, is always already-out-ahead-of-itself in its futural projection, directed toward the accomplishment of meaningful tasks. Dreyfus (2001) provides a clear and accessible explanation of understanding as know-how when writing that for Heidegger, understanding "makes possible skillful coping," and "relates some activities as doable, as making sense, and others as not, or better, it does not recognize these other possibilities as possibilities at all" (184-185). Understanding is directed toward accomplishing one or another task, "coping with the available proceeds by pressing into possibilities," and Dasein's "coping is organized by a for-the-sake-ofwhich," and this for Heidegger is bound up with projection (Ibid., 186-187). Projection, it must be noted, is always involved with the entities with which Dasein deals, which of course includes others, in terms of understanding and most importantly, possibilities. However, as Heidegger (1962) is careful to point out, projection is not to be conflated with a willful "comporting oneself toward a plan that has been thought out" in a reasoned and thematic manner, rather projection is "the existential structure" of understanding, which means that Dasein is always already in the world in such a way that it is projected out toward its possibilities as potential - projection is the "kind of Being of Dasein in which it is its possibilities as possibilities" (185/145).

Huebner (1974) also equates understanding with *know-how*, through which we are empowered to *do something* with the insights we glean by means of interpretative (hermeneutic) activity. However, as opposed to purely instrumental knowledge acquired through the application of one or another "scientific method," Huebner views understanding as akin to existential, or *meditative* insight, where "doing something" with understanding includes "new exploring, more satisfying expression, deeper and more meaningful encounters with others, greater awareness of what and who [we are], and more ability to build and transform the world" (40). This relates directly to Heidegger's (1962) claim that Dasein's understanding "is not cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically" (385/336). Rather, it is linked to the "Being of the 'there' [of Dasein's disclosedness]," and is "primordially existential, it means *to be* projecting towards a potentiality-for-Being for the sake of which Dasein exists" (Ibid., 385/336). Through understanding Dasein projects its *for-the-sake-of-which*, when it is open to futural possibilities that are on the approach, which acquire meaning only in relation to the significance of the structure, or *referential*

totality, of the for-the-sake-of-which, the towards-this, and the in-order-to of the authentic "worldhood of its current world" (Ibid., 185/145).

As related to the previous discussion of Dasein's projection, this for-the-sake-of-which is not a determinative goal or end that Dasein posits in advance of its activities, rather it is a way of understanding the meaning-schemata of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, where all projects and involvements are conceived as "potential" possibilities for Dasein's Being. The system of relations (referential totality) that Heidegger describes pertains to Dasein's Being-in-the-world as a whole. In addition, it must be noted that Dasein's the for-the-sake-of-which is always being projected within a community, for Dasein can never have self-knowledge or authentic knowledge of its world at a remove from its communal dwelling. Heidegger (1962) is clear on this matter when writing, "The world of Dasein is a world-with [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with-others. Their Being-in-themselveswithin-the-world is Dasein with [Mit-Dasein]" (155/118). Specifically, in relation to the process of education envisioned by Huebner, it is possible to state that the for-the-sake-of-which of authentic learning represents the ever-changing and ever-renewed ground of the authentic learning environment, because it is always rich with future potential, where educational goals, purposes, and aims for student achievement are imminent within and emerge from the unfolding of the processes of learning. This represents an anti-foundational view of both the human and the world, where our continued questioning puts the notion of solid ground into question. This also represents an antifoundational view of education and the curriculum. Reading Thomson (2005), this view is consistent with the merging of ontology and education, which indicates that when "our understanding of what beings are changes historically, our understanding of what 'education' is transforms as well" (248).

Interpretation for Heidegger (1962) works to clarify what is ambiguously given in understanding, and is never a "presuppositionless apprehending" of things, because all of our interpretations begin as "something," in terms of Dasein's *fore-having, fore-sight*, and *for-conception* (190-191/150). Prior to engaging the world, we possess a veiled and incomplete understanding of the things we seek to interpret and eventually come to know. This pre-understanding is at once "something we have in advance…something we see in advance… something we grasp in advance" (Ibid., 191/150). All three terms Heidegger employs represent the various presuppositions (and the ways of gathering these) that we have about that which is to be interrogated and interpreted - the things we seek to know always already speak to us, revealing something of their nature, in advance of our inquiries: "Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought" (Ibid., 25/5). In educational terms, we might refer to this as the communal "store of knowledge" that we bring to the issues at hand in the present context of inquiry, which precedes and is indeed essential to all interpretive endeavors.

For example, in *Being and Time* Heidegger asks the *fundamental* question: "What is the meaning of Being?" It is possible to approach this issue in the first instance because the meaning of Being is already available to us in some form, which allows us to ask the question and enter into the hermeneutic circle. Although our pre-understanding of Being is incomplete, as Heidegger states, "this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact" (Ibid., 25/5). Thus, we approach the problem of Being qua Being guided in the first instance by its uniqueness as well as a preconception of what it might be, seeking to clarify the adumbrated presence of Being as it already exists within our "everyday" ways of knowing in order to eventually deepen and solidify our understanding of it. This is accomplished through hermeneutic interpretation, where our pre-understanding of things, as it were, allows us to step into the circle, or spiral, of interpretation. When things, in relation to our Being are understood, "we say that they have meaning [Sinn]"(Ibid., 190-191/150). As we work to clarify our understanding through interpretation we produce or construct meaning, and as Heidegger claims, meaning represents "the 'upon which' of a projection in terms of which

something becomes interrogated as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception" (Ibid., 193/151).

Indeed, this form of making-meaning is precisely what Huebner (1974) has in mind when he talks of hermeneutic activity in education as central to the dialectic between individuals, their history, and world in terms of a "confrontation," which he describes as the *rhythmic continuity-change* of the individual's understanding as it is dynamically shaped through his involvement with the world. For Huebner, hermeneutical activity is a communal art, interpretation is an ongoing process and is always at work in education, and "whether by asking questions, establishing written assignments, reading to the child, or pronouncing words for him, educators are introducing him to traditions of interpretations" (Ibid., 48). However, interpretation for Huebner is never limited to purely academic issues, never a privileged practice within the classrooms of the institutions. Rather, Huebner (1999a) claims that hermeneutic interpretation is in fact a public practice, or discourse, that transcends the bounds of the classroom and is always open to "consider the different rhythms continuity-change between society as a whole, and the individuals who compose it" (140). Speculating on curriculum content, Huebner claims that when selecting programs of study educators must keep in mind that the "educational environment is consequently related to the forces controlling the continuity-change rhythms" of society, and Huebner embraces the notion that there is a reciprocity, and beyond, a symbiotic relationship, between education, the human, and its historical world (Ibid., 140).

C. Heidegger's Interpretation of Dasein's Temporality

No reading of "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality" would be complete without an explanation of temporality. Huebner (1999a) states that in Being and Time Heidegger presents this groundbreaking philosophical notion in a most fruitful manner, and goes on to observe that the complexity of Heidegger's presentation of temporality "almost equals the complexity of the phenomenon of time" (Ibid., 136). Huebner provides a succinct explication of Heidegger's ecstatic temporality, which indicates that "human life is never fixed but is always emergent as the past and future become horizons of the present" (Ibid., 137). Although Huebner talks of the present in terms of the "moment of vision," where "past and future are the horizons of the individual's present so that his own potentiality for being is grasped," in Huebner's essay, it is unclear exactly how this complex phenomenon occurs (141). Considering Huebner's claim that the "moment of vision" represents the "essential ingredient of the educational environment," it is crucial to elucidate Heidegger's philosophy of esstatic temporality for the reader (Ibid., 141). Attempting to do so, I pose the following compound question, to which I provide a response in the sections that follow: How are we to understand and formalize this difficult, if not elusive, view of time, in terms that are not only conceptually clear, but also in terms of this phenomenon having potential meaning for our educational practices?

Heidegger (1992a) boldly makes the following declaration: "Dasein conceived in its most extreme possibility of Being *is time itself* and not *in* time" (14e). Time is not objective, for the duration or length of time cannot be measured scientifically by way of mathematical symbols, for time has no length. Time is not linear, and neither the wall-cock nor wristwatch properly presents time, and according to Heidegger, by treating time as a quantitative phenomenon, measurable in length, in its extension, the clock attempts to show us "what" time is, but misses the more substantial ontological-existential matter of *how time is*, which is to say, the way in which we enact our time when living as temporal, existential beings. Heidegger claims that our Dasein is inextricably

grounded in *ecstatic temporality*, wherein past, present, and future are united, indivisible, perpetually working in concert within the moment of our present.

For Heidegger, this moment of the present is the authentic moment of vision (Augenblick), i.e., the revelation of truth and subsequent appropriation of our authentic Being-in-the-world. It is not "present" in terms of a point that is situated between future and past. It is the moment when world, beings, and entities reveal themselves in ways that matter within the "there," or disclosedness, of Dasein. As Heidegger (1962) states, this moment of vision is possible due to the convergence of past and future, and this suggests that the past circles round to meet us, "the coming [Kunft] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, comes toward itself," from out of the indeterminate future (373/326). In Heidegger's model the past is never legitimately gone and thus the fact that we have a past cannot be overlooked or skirted, as it represents our being thrown-into-the-world in a specific and unique manner. However, the past acquires meaning only when we authentically project it into the future, and when "authentically futural, Dasein is authentically as 'having-been,' as its own thrown past' (Ibid., 373/327).

Authenticity for Heidegger (1992a), represents our "most extreme possibility" of enacting our existence; it is a life in *praxis*, a temporal process of taking over our existence through interpretive decision-making, whereby we legitimize our thrown-past (having-been) in the service of making (and re-making) our future Being with others (10e). Dasein's authentic Selfhood is only to be found in the "authentic-potentiality-for-being-one's-self – that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein's Being as care" (Heidegger, 1962, 369/322). For Heidegger (1992a), the "primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality" and this relates to the Being of Dasein. The "Care-structure" embodies the three moments, or horizons, of ecstatic temporality: (1) we are always out-ahead-of-ourselves in the projection of a future, (2) we are always along side both things and Others in the world, and (3) we are always already in the world as a thrown, living being, as someone with a past, a history and heritage (297). When considering this model of temporality, of which "clock time" is merely derivative, it is crucial to acknowledge that the past, which constitutes our living history as heritage, is sewn into the very fabric of our Being. The past is continually at work influencing and shaping the moment of vision through its ever-attendant presence. The past serves as the source of our historical life and future, it allows us to redefine our existence by choosing to choose possibilities that emerge from our heritage, which represents for Heidegger, one of the ontological-existential structures, along with fate and destiny, comprising our historicity, or authentic historical Being.

It is possible to grasp temporality in the following manner: In the moment of resolute openness (Entschlossenheit), the mood of Angst individuates Dasein for its death and ownmost possibilities for Being, opening what Heidegger terms, the "Situation," or the authentic way of "Being-there." Conceived as a temporal phenomenon, the Situation is Dasein's moment of vision or instant of authenticity. "In the instant as an ecstases," writes Heidegger (1992b), "the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into the factically determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of action" (297). This is the authentic present of esstatic temporality, when Dasein, accessible and free, projects itself into its possibilities within the factical and distinct circumstances of its own unique life. Such an authentic resolute openness to worldly encounters is only possible because Dasein, as a temporal being that temporalizes, is at once its future, past, and present as thrown-projecting Being-in-the-world.

The present, for Heidegger (1992b), which is held within authentic temporality, is the sustaining form of Dasein's authentic choices, representing the "resolute rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of concern" (Ibid., 287). The authentic temporalizing of Dasein occurs as it projects its finite possibilities, which initiates a forward movement towards itself as resolute Being-towards-death in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and this movement secures a "repetition," or authentic

retrieval, of Dasein's past, its having-been. In coming to or toward itself, from out of its indeterminate future, as engendered by its own past, Dasein discloses the meaning of authentic Being within the instant of the present, or moment of vision (Angenblick), of the Situation. This ecstatic temporal process is "ecstatical" because it represents an existence wherein Dasein "stands-out" from the temporal moment it currently embodies, e.g., in the present (horizon), Dasein is always already standing-out ahead of itself into the future (horizon) while at once embodying (standing-out as) its past (horizon) in anticipation of its projection. When Dasein exists authentically, it temporalizes the "moment of vision" and it experiences the world in its basic "unconcealment" – allowing that which shows itself from itself to be seen – now not disclosing beings as present-at-hand entities, or objects, but the phenomenon of world as such, the worldhood of the world, i.e., the overarching matrix of meaning and purpose structuring Dasein's Being-in-the-world, which understanding and interpretation have in great part made possible. The process of temporalizing, as described above, along with the concepts and terms I have introduced relating to Dasein's authentic historical existence (historicity), will be further explained and developed as I move to address Huebner's individual-world dialectic in its relation to the environmental design of the curriculum.

D. The Ontological Grounds of the Individual-World Dialectic and Authentic Historical Existence: Curriculum as Environmental Design

For Huebner (1999a), the *individual-world dialectic* inspires the authentic *environmental design* of the curriculum. The *environmental design* is bound by the horizon of *temporality* and, as outlined, it engenders the most important aspect of the educational environment, the "moment of vision." For Huebner, the ideal learning environment requires three components and represents the unfolding of human *temporality* as *historicity*. The authentic curriculum: (1) *calls forth a response* from the student, (2) is *reactive*, and (3) makes possible authentic *moments of vision*, "when the student and/or those responsible to him, project his potentiality-for-Being into the present, thus tying together the future and the past into the present" (Ibid., 139). The educative process conceived by Huebner emerges directly from Heidegger's philosophy in *Being and Time*, which details the processes by which Dasein becomes *as* an authentically historical being. As previously stated, this includes the understanding of Dasein's authentic *historicity* and the notions of *heritage*, *fate*, and *destiny* - the invariant existential-ontological structures that make possible the enactment of Dasein's authentic historical existence, or the process of *historicizing* (the stretching out between Dasein's birth and death), all of which correspond to the human's temporal Being presented by Heidegger in terms of the "Carestructure," or the Being of Dasein *as temporality*.

It is crucial to note that Huebner envisions the *environmental design* of the curriculum in terms of a model in tripartite, wherein each component might be related to a specific horizon of the temporal structure of Dasein (past, future, and present). The environmental design of the curriculum, we might say, along with Heidegger's (1962) understanding of *temporality*, "has a unity of a future which makes present in the process of having-been" (Ibid., 374/326). Huebner looks to Heidegger in order to indicate that educators should be concerned with a curriculum design organized around the understanding that learning unfolds authentically in terms of a temporal phenomenon, where the student's Being is embraced as primordially constituting "the totality of the structure of care" (Ibid., 376/328). In this way, Huebner provides us not only with a reconfigured view of education, but also with a radically new ontological conception of the student in terms of Heidegger's rendering of "care," which, as Dasein's "primordial structural totality, lies before ["vor"] every factical 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein" (Ibid., 238/193).

(1) The calling forth a response from the student, as Huebner (1999a) writes, entails the recognition that the "individual is thrown into a world, not necessarily of his own making, but an embodiment of the past" (139). This relates to Heidegger's notion of heritage, which contributes to the makeup of Dasein's world because it is an inherited form of life that it shares with its community. When living authentically, Dasein enacts the possibilities that it draws from its heritage, which are taken up in the process of "repetition" (wiederholen), i.e., repeating through appropriation (interpretation and understanding) some possibility from its past. However, repetition is not to be thought of as merely accepting, or worse, aping, the traditions, beliefs, and ways of life that are inherited. Rather, the process of repeating our heritage amounts to creatively reinterpreting the past, drawing on the collective ethos of our society, and then either selecting or rejecting, affirming or denying certain aspects as they relate to our ownmost possibilities for Being. To be authentically "historical" involves taking on the responsibility for the choices and decisions of our forebears, and for this reason Heidegger stresses the burden of our heritage. Dasein distances itself from the status quo, from the vulgar interpretations of the "They-self," when authentically repeating the heritage of its possibilities in resoluteness. Repetition might be conceived in terms of appropriating the possibilities that have been "handed down" to me from my heritage, in "repeating" my possibilities, I am freely and creatively reinterpreting my heritage in light of my specific and unique potential for Being. By repeating my heritage, as Heidegger (1962) indicates, I am explicitly "going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" (437/385).

The curriculum as conceived by Huebner represents the authentic dwelling of students and educators in the midst of living traditions, wherein they consider questions about what is valued, what traditions should be preserved or altered, and what traditions should remain as part of the collective memory now and in the future. This is not simply about teaching students about our past and its traditions, not simply about decided what knowledge from our past is most valuable and therefore should be learned and passed along. Rather, authentic education represents a collective decision between students and educators about what aspects of our tradition, or collective ethos, are in fact worthy to be taken up and appropriated in "repetition" and projected, as authentic possibility, into the future as our authentic destiny, which occurs through creative acts of interpretation. In order to call forth responses from students the living aspects of their heritage must be embraced and must be recognized as forming the authentic past, for in such a view our heritage alone is worthy enough to demand and warrant a response, a rejoinder that takes seriously the responsibility we have to our own unique potentiality-for-Being. Heritage, as we will see, plays a crucial role in the fateful enactment of Dasein's authentic destiny.

Huebner (1999a) refers to heritage as the students' "collective wealth," which includes speech patterns, forms of dialogue, language of the curriculum, and the structural forms of various disciplines. Heritage includes everything from the "social customs shaping interacting patterns" to the "man-made things that makeup much of the man's world" (139). Our heritage, according to Huebner (1974), contains "the stuff for our hermeneutic and world-building arts," which informs the fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception that students bring to the context of interpretation (37). The authentic environmental design of the curriculum, structured around the understanding of temporality, fosters learning wherein memories of the student's existence are set within a "caring collectivity in which individuals share memories and intentions," and through the process of hermeneutic interpretation, "form a bridge between self and other; a linkage among past, present, and future; the vehicle by which individuals, in community, arrive at mutual understanding in the conduct of their public affairs," and enact their collective destiny through education (Ibid., 37). The past becomes the means by which students project their own potentiality-for-Being as historical, and the educational environment must be designed with the understanding that the past is always present as the basis for our futural projection. This relates to what Heidegger (1962) claims about

heritage and "the possibility that Dasein might choose its hero" from out of the myriad of historical possibilities that the past has made available for potential appropriation (437/385). In order for Dasein to choose its hero, as Inwood (1991) claims, it "must return to the past, perhaps to its own birth, but more likely beyond. There are great philosophers, generals, statesmen, artists, saints, and lovers whose deeds and works are part of Dasein's heritage" (92).

(2) According to Huebner (1999a), in addition to calling forth a response from students, the educational environment "must be reactive, or else the student must question it so that it responds to him" (139). This aspect also concerns the values that are part of the heritage of students and educators' past being brought into the present. This aspect of the curriculum design involves the interaction between the individual and the community, representing the "shaping component of the world," which allows us to channel and project our personal transcendence into "accepted patterns of social transcendence" (Ibid., 139). This component of the curriculum design might be related to Heidegger's notion of fate (Schicksal). Fate is that aspect of historicity that is at once individual and potentially communal, in terms of Dasein's collective destiny, for as Heidegger (1962) states, "fateful Dasein as Being-in-the-world exists essentially in Being-with-Others" (436/384). With the notion of fate, Heidegger is not referring to the common understanding of the term, i.e., a predetermined destiny, where our lives are measured out and determined through providence. For Heidegger, fate is related to Dasein's authentic understanding of its radical limitations, or finitude, and is determinative of Dasein's futural projection and the enpresenting of the "moment of vision." Fate is the manner in which Dasein opens the present and experiences its freedom as an occurrence. Dasein's freedom, which is a freedom towards its authentic possibilities, arises from the limitations and *finitude* of its existence. Fate is the how of comportment when Dasein enacts its authentic existence as thrownprojection (heritage); it is, as Heidegger claims, "the authentic resoluteness in which Dasein holds itself free for death, in a possibility it has inherited and yet chosen" (Ibid., 435/384).

In *fate*, there is a recognition and resoluteness to the fact that we must draw upon a limited number of possibilities from our *heritage* along with the understanding that our ability to choose from among those possibilities is also limited, and in the extreme, we are faced with death, the end of all possibilities. The two notions of resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) and death (*vorlaufen* – anticipating, or *running-ahead-to death*) will require a bit of unpacking for the reader as they are crucial terms and relate intimately to Heidegger's rendering of *historicity*. The ontological experience of death, provides us with unique insight into our Dasein,

we experience ourselves as an existential [ontological] projecting without any existential [ontic-practical] projects to project ourselves upon, and so come to understand ourselves as, at bottom, an existential *projecting*, a projecting which is more basic than and independent of any particular projects which usually give our lives content and meaning (Thomson, 2004, 452).

In running-ahead-to-death we embody our existential potential to enact a unique and communal existence as authentic Dasein. The notion of death in Heidegger must not be read in terms of "demise," for he is not referring to the literal biological event of our physical extinction, but rather he is referring to death's ontological significance as human mortality. For as Thomson points out, death is clearly "something I live through" (Ibid., 453). However, living through death in an authentic manner amounts to experiencing a break down of all our worldly projects, which occurs, according to Heidegger (1993), in the mode of attunement of Angst, the alienating mood of the "not-at-home" (Unheimlichkeit). The break down of our projects is best grasped in terms of the moment when our everyday ways of existing (inauthentic) fall into a state of confusion; meanings and interrelations are lost, our life no longer makes sense, and a slipping away of beings occurs (103). Thomson (2004)

argues that this "actual experience of complete world-collapse and subsequent passage through death is what Heidegger *calls* "resoluteness," and it is the second structural moment in his phenomenological account of *authenticity*" (453).

Resoluteness unlocks our potential to reconnect with the world of our possibilities in an enlightened and reflective manner, we are changed in our Being and we are free to choose authentically the possibilities that have been given over to us for appropriation (*through* repetition) by *heritage*. Thomson gives a clear elucidation of this concept when stating,

"Resoluteness" (*Entschlossenheit*) is Heidegger's name for such free decisions, by which we recognize that the self, as a (projectless) projecting, is more powerful than (that is, *survives*) death (the collapse of its world projects), and so become capable of "choosing to choose," making a lucid reconnection to the world (Ibid., 454).

Thomson reiterates what I previously stated, namely, that the freedom for enacting our possibilities is always finite, and in some manner determined, or better, "constrained" by our facticity, i.e., "our inherited talents, cares, and predispositions" can be altered through interpretation, but cannot simply be discarded or transcended, for facticity is comprised of the "pre-existing concerns of our time and 'generation" (Ibid., 454). As related specifically to the discussion of fate, Heidegger (1962) states that "it is not necessary that in resoluteness one should explicitly know the origin of the possibilities upon which the resoluteness projects itself," and so he refrains from discussing the tangible and concrete possibilities that are made available to the resolute Dasein for its comportment when analyzing the phenomena of Being-towards-death and historicity. This leaves the reader wondering: From where do Dasein's authentic possibilities arise? Heidegger claims that it is in fact from the past, as heritage, that Dasein's factical possibilities, in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, first arise, representing the so-called "content" of authentic existence to which form is provided by Dasein through the autonomous enactment of its communal and historical destiny: "The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage" (Ibid., 435/383).

There is another aspect of resoluteness that deserves attention and is linked with *fate* that is crucial to fully understanding the authentically historical Dasein and it is to be found within the following claim by Heidegger (1962): "Resoluteness [Entscholssenheit] is a distinctive mode of Dasein's disclosure [Erschlossenheit]" (343/297). The mode of disclosure that is resoluteness is Dasein's authentic self-disclosure, and what is revealed provides Dasein with insight into its Being-inthe-world as Being-with-Others. Heidegger states that resoluteness, "as authentic Being-one's-Self, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating T," rather resoluteness first "brings the Self right into its current concernful Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into its solicitous Being with Others" (Ibid., 344/298). With this notion of solicitous Being-with-Others, Heidegger indicates that when existing in an authentic manner, we are attentive to others and the world we inhabit. Indeed, the resoluteness of fate provides the emergence of the ontological understanding, which is always antecedent to the enactment of Dasein's authentic possibilities, that Dasein is at once beholden to its past as heritage and responsible for the future as it relates to the past through its intimate and solicitous communal relations. Thus, we see how the ontological-existential structures of heritage and fate are related in Heidegger's treatment of historicity.

What Heidegger claims about the beholden and responsible nature of Dasein clearly informs Huebner's understanding of the authentic *environmental design* of the curriculum, and is expressed by Huebner (1999a) in terms of the educator demonstrating care for the past and its valued memories and traditions - the collective wealth of the society - and expressing a dutiful responsibility for the future development of the collective wealth in terms of the pilgrimage [destiny]

of the society as inspired by the authentic educative processes. The authentic environmental design of the curriculum fosters a reactive (fateful) component, which manifests in the reciprocal counterstriving between the student and his world. This is because authentic education acknowledges temporality and historicity and embraces the shared collective wealth, the "valued past," as it is "brought into the present of the student" (139). Huebner (1974) is clear, as related to Heideggerian thought, that education cannot effectively begin its "thinking with the individual," in terms of the isolated free-floating subject, making the "past and the community secondary," for this is a disingenuous way to conceive the human being (41). In order to address the ontological concerns of the student's Being, Huebner insists that educators "must start with all three: The individual, the past, and the community," then, the task becomes for education, finding ways of inquiring into the ontological interrelatedness between these three components of historicity (Ibid., 41).

(3) In order to facilitate moments of vision in the curriculum, moments where the student's authentic possibilities for Being manifest for appropriation, the environment "must provide opportunities for the student to become aware of his temporality," encouraging the student to actively "participate in a history," which represents the "continual creation of the world" along with the recognition of his fateful and autonomous involvement "as an ingredient in the transcendency of the world" (139). Here, we have Heidegger's notion of destiny, which refers to the historizing of a community in which people draw from a collective heritage and fatefully enact their existence through "communication" and "struggle." Destiny is not merely a collection of disparate, individual fates, for it is guided in advance by the fact that Dasein's existence is Being-with-Others. With this treatment of destiny, Heidegger brings the discussion of historicity in Being and Time to a close, as this discussion represents the totality of Dasein's authentic existence. It is possible to view destiny as an inspired mode of praxis, in terms of choice, deliberation, and struggle: When heritage is revealed to Dasein as its given endowment (as throwness), it is Dasein's fate to enact collectively its destiny. Heidegger sums up this authentic phenomenon in the following succinct manner when stating that Dasein's authentic historizing

is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny* [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects...Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its "generation" goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein...Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let Others who are with it "be" in their ownmost potentialisty-for-Being, and so co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates (436/384-385).

Within the authentic *environmental design* of the curriculum, as Huebner (1999c) argues, educators must work with students in order to ready and liberate them in moments of resolute openness, to enact their authentic possibilities, moments where the indeterminate future approaches to converge with their past, which is carried into, thereby breaking open, the authentic present, or the moment of vision. In light of the ground covered, it is possible to imagine authentic education as conceived by Huebner unfolding by means of hermeneutic *meaning-making*, informed by the student's authentic potential-for-Being. Authentic education makes possible the emergence of the student's authentic possibilities, and in the moment of vision, through appropriation (as repetition), the student enacts his authentic way of *Being-in-the-world* as *Being-with Others*. In terms of Heidegger's (1962) understanding of *destiny*, it is possible to envision the classroom as a place of dwelling wherein "our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities" (436/385). According to Huebner (1974),

the *fateful* repetition of our *heritage* as *destiny* is expressed within and worked out through the reciprocal tension between the individual, the society, and its collective wealth, which in terms echoing Heidegger's conception of *destiny*, "is lived out in the community and in the struggles among diverse communities" (40). The design of the classroom environment, within an authentic view to education, seeks to ensure the collective *destiny* of its students and sets up the solicitous context, which reveals the

presence of a community with traditions of care for people and for collective wealth, a community that honors and develops individual and collective wealth, a community that honors and develops individual and collective memory, that articulates and acts our intensions (Ibid., 40).

It is possible to conceive Heidegger's notion of destiny, as enacted within the individual-world dialectic, as the ecumenical pursuit of authentic learning in terms of what Huebner calls education's pilgrimage, which is the journey of educators and students toward their authentic historical selfhood within an educational dwelling resembling an originary community of learners. In this learning community, as Heidegger's (2004) philosophy suggests, students and educators are beholden and responsible to the processes of education because "each individual is bound up in advance to something that binds and determines each individual by exceeding them," and this occurs within an atmosphere of solicitous care that unfolds through the process of interpretive meaning-making (74). Here, student and educator care for the communal archive of knowledge that is developing within various learning experiences, which is bound up with care for both the student's store of knowledge and the student's unique cultural heritage as related to his own unique possibility for existence, which grows and evolves within the flux, flow, and dynamic unfolding of education as a temporalhistorical phenomenon. When learning authentically with others, we share a like-minded sense of care for our common fate as learners. Destiny is the authentic enactment of our potentiality-for-Being as historical, when through communication and struggle we make and remake our world as a people, and it culminates in the "repetition," or appropriation, of a possibility from our past in a reinterpreted and renewed form, and it is only in the moment of vision that this authentic appropriation of our past is possible.

The repetition of our *heritage* in fateful *destiny* should be conceived as a dialogue with the past, and this is precisely how Huebner (1999d) conceives of Being-in-the-world, for

through discourse man articulates his being-in-the-world as thrown and as possibility. Discourse puts into words the totality of significations, the related instruments and entities which man can use for his own sake. In all talk, man talks about something. At the same time, his being is expressed and "explicitly shared" with others (147).

In similar terms, Inwood (1991) suggests that the repetition of our *heritage* is a "conversation with the past or with some past hero," e.g., "Alexander or Plato makes certain suggestions" to us through their exploits or written words, and we "make a rejoinder to them" (92). Ultimately, through communal discourse *as* hermeneutic interpretation, repetition becomes a legitimate possibility of our Being, and through developing and deepening our interpretations of the world, which emerge through a confrontation with the past and past-as-present, we are in the position to authentically *choose to choose ourselves* through communal decision-making. We are only truly beholden to our *heritage* when we approach the past in order to see, understand, and beyond, envision ways in which it might be reinterpreted in light of our authentic potentiality-for-Being and taken up, through "repetition" in an authentic mode of historical appropriation, which both Heidegger and

Huebner understand in terms of the human being's authentic enactment of its *destiny* through the process of *historizing*.

3. Huebner's Heidegger: Potential Implications for an Authentic Education

A. Authentic Understanding and Education

Inauthentic learning, as found in the social efficiency model for education, is concerned with knowledge that is both instrumental and of a distinct variety, namely, logical-rational-scientific, and education that lives in the shadow of positivism runs the ever-present risk of degenerating into a form of curriculum-making where technicalization and hyperrationalization dominate. The former focuses on the utility of our knowledge at the exclusion of the concern for meanings, for why we do things and why they are meaningful to us; the latter favors the application of reason alone to our analyses of the world at the exclusion of the concern for the emotional and spiritual dimensions of our Being. Education in this view is reduced to students navigating the world of present-at-hand entities with the goal of mastering and controlling the environment and the things therein by means of the power they gain through acquiring objective knowledge. Not that educators should avoid experiences that focus on the empirically verifiable aspects of reality, but this form of learning-knowledge should not be privileged above all other ways of knowing, understanding, and intuiting the crucial dimensions of the student's Being. Hermeneutic interpretive meaning-making should be an integral part of the learning experience in the classroom and educators should demonstrate a genuine concern for the many intangible aspects of the learner's Being-in-the-world, which cannot be quantifiably measured or validated by means of the traditional epistemological model grounded in the differentiation between a priori-analytic and a posteriori-synthetic.

Authentic education organizes learning experiences so as to encourage students to inhabit and interact with the world of the classroom in terms of being "open" to the world they encounter within the various activities that comprise their learning experience. Students should be encouraged to allow things to come to presence in truth, in the very light of their own self-showing, and most importantly, in ways that matter to them, in ways that have meaning for their Being. Educators should resolutely pursue the formation of students by *letting them be*, as it were, allowing their unique possibilities for Being to shine forth. The essence of truth, and hence knowledge and understanding, should not be thought of as residing in propositions, formulae, standardized tests, or other such vehicles for packaging, transmitting, and assessing the validity of truth, all of which express the correspondence between the internal representation (idea) of the subject and the existing (real) objective state-of-affairs. Rather, the essential way in which we are "in-truth" occurs through disclosure, as we are "there" in moments of authentic discovery, which is the occurrence of both students and educators actively uncovering their authentic possibilities as related to their Being within the authentic context of navigating solutions to the problems they encounter.

B. Authentic Temporality and Education

Due to an inauthentic understanding of time, educators orient the curriculum and the learning experience contained therein toward the future, which is conceived as knowable and determinate, creating an education program wherein goals, aims, and purposes are posited in advance of the authentic experience of education in its practical enactment, and toward which students are then led. Such a strict *product-process* model for curriculum assumes that it can specify the student's future behavior because it is determinate and thus predictable. In many instances, the student's authentic

possibilities are defined in advance by professionals residing at an external and temporal remove from the authentic unfolding of the student's Being in the processes of learning. For example, private foundations (Carnegie Corporation) and accrediting testing agencies (ETS – Education Testing Service), situated at a remove from the classroom, represent professional organizations that are in charge of establishing the standards for learning within educational institutions. This expression of the inauthentic understanding of time covers over and obscures the student's genuine potentiality-for-Being. Whereas the authentic understanding of temporality makes possible moments of resolute openness, wherein students choose to enact their authentic possibilities, within a learning environment facilitating the autonomous and self-directed revelation and appropriation of their authentic possibilities for the enactment of their Being.

Due to the inauthentic understanding of time, it is also possible for educators to remain locked within a view to the present, which presupposes an understanding of time where the past is gone and irretrievable and the future has not yet arrived. This represents a form of *linear-presentism* in education, i.e., the current conception and inception of educational systems, institutions, philosophies, and theories are conceived as existing "in time," and since they are viewed only through the lens of the present, as *making-present*, they assume eternal, indelible, and hypostatic characteristics, making the possibility for authentic educational reform not only a daunting task, but a fatalistic impossibility. This view of time remains blind to the crucial role that the past plays, as *heritage*, in the *historizing* process of the student, which represents her unique potentiality-for-Being as related her living past (and not merely a historical past), which is always alive with the potential for growth and transcendence, and is taken up into the authentic leaning experience, which is the convergence of past and future in the moment of vision.

There are also models for curriculum-making that are situated in the present while demonstrating an unquestioned reverence for the past and its educational traditions, where change is viewed in terms of superficial improvements to a grounding, foundational form that essentially remains unchallenged and unchanged. These philosophies of education have firm roots in the thought of the past and present. When conceiving an *essential* education for students, in terms of a perennial or *permanent curriculum*, they are really imitating the past, aping the past, recreating the past in the present without attempting to reassess or reinterpret it in light of the students' needs and wants, in terms of their unique and futural potential-for-Being. This inauthentic view of education embraces the *status quo* in curriculum, its content, pedagogical methodology, and assessment strategies, and in no way represents the *emancipatory* move, inspired by qualitative research in phenomenology, beyond the current manner in which students, education, and society are conceived.

C. Authentic Historicity and Education

Authentic education, conceived as unfolding within the *individual-world dialectic* does not adopt the procedural method of establishing goals, aims, and purposes of education in advance of learning experiences, as is consistent with *product-process* curriculum design. Rather, it is possible to imagine, in line with *process-product* models for curriculum, the goals and aims for learning and authentic standards for education always already imminent as *potential* in the authentic unfolding of the curriculum in progress, e.g., the *for-the-sake-of-which* that education is concerned with does not provide a determinate and immutable goal or purpose in advance of the learning. In line with the phenomenological method, it is possible to imagine educational goals and purposes emerging through a process of hermeneutic interpretation, where educators begin with a pre-supposition concerning goals and outcomes, but these goals and outcomes are fluid and protean in nature, they

change, evolve, develop and are reworked as knowledge and understanding of the student's needs, wants, desires, and abilities are revealed and interpreted by the educator. Although the educational aims for student achievement are set forth at the outset of the learning, they are more akin to informed suggestions, *path-marks* for learning, and are always subject to revision and elaboration as the educator deepens and clarifies his understanding of that which emerges from the learning experience, which is always at work shaping and in the process of being shaped by the dynamic flux and flow of the society and culture.

There are crucial ethical implications bound up with authentic education concerned with the manner in which we dwell in community with others. Since the environmental design of the curriculum is grounded in the ontological understanding of temporality and historicity, i.e., the authentic heritage, fate, and destiny of educators and students, learning transpires within an inclusive, multi-cultural environment, and beyond, depends for its authenticity on educator's embracing the inclusion of the language and cultural forms of knowledge that each student brings to the context of learning. The notion of heritage as embodying our living past, the unique collective ethos of the student's given culture, our collective ethos as members of a community, state, and nation, the store of unique cultural possibilities that allow for the authentic projection into our future as destiny, testifies that education must avoid leveling down or excluding the diverse cultural histories and values of our students. Understanding heritage as a legitimate component for our future growth and development should awaken educators to the necessity of transcending unethical and inauthentic practices and policies that socially, culturally, and linguistically marginalize students. For example, curriculums designed in the tradition of scholar academic philosophy, where goals, purposes, and learning are defined in terms of cultural literacy or the "Great Books" of the Western canon, do violence to the understanding of the inclusion of diverse cultural traditions in the curriculum, and represent forms of inauthentic education.

Authentic learning within the *individual-world dialectic* also embodies the ethical aspects of social-based learning, where students learn from each other and indeed teach each other in a variety of ways, and is concerned with the respectful exchange of ideas in ways that demonstrate care, tolerance, and a critical conscious awareness. The educational environment should be understood in terms of sustaining both epistemological and axiological, or normative, concerns. Authentic student learning is never reducible to the implementation of hyper-efficient methods for assimilating and processing knowledge, as if training up the student's web of neural circuitry. Authentic learning is more akin to the process of Bildung, or "learning as formation," which happens through the process of dialogue and is the very opposite of "training," the filling up of empty vessels with knowledge, or the passing along of skills. Rather, it is a monumental transformative process whereby the student assists actively in the process of education, which includes, importantly, the formation of the student's disposition and character. Since authentic learning stresses self-development and group development through communicative debate, the communal character of the classroom includes the all-important concern for moral development and engenders learning through a process of arduous and respectful discourse, which plays out in the dialogical process of accepting, rejecting, refining, validating, and honing the various interpretations that are offered up for debate in shared moments of problem-solving. There is recognition of the strengths and weaknesses that are either beneficial or detrimental to the personal development of the self and group. Educators and students work to arrive at common, agreeable solutions to the problems they attempt to solve through a process of critical debate, which is always rooted in the ever-changing needs of our students and their historical reality, which represents an ever-renewed ethical quest for knowledge, understanding, and meaning.

In addition to the student's heritage, he also brings a vast store of intellectual and emotional experience to the learning context, which holds vast potential to make a contribution to evergrowing, ever-developing communal archive of student knowledge: This represents the *fore-having*,

fore-sight, and for-conception necessary for educators and students to step into the hermeneutic circle of authentic interpretation where meaning is constructed within a context of composed of a multiplicity of "perspectives." Through the unfolding hermeneutic and heuristic activities, student's interpretations are composed of clusters of interpretations, because individual interpretations always develop along with, and indeed because of, those with whom the student participates with in the process of authentic learning. Thus, there is an all-important bridge constructed between prior knowledge, which is valued as legitimately contributing to the learning, and new knowledge. Authentic education also embraces alternative forms of knowledge in the curriculum, e.g., "human wisdom" and meditative thought, which allow educators and students to approach ontological aspects of their existence in a philosophical manner through a rigorous form of non-conceptual and non-systematic thought.

4. Concluding Thoughts: Transcendence, Liberation, and Emancipation

According to Huebner, authentic discourse on education reform cannot begin until educational professionals seriously consider the individual's relation to society and its cultural traditions. In light of these aforementioned concerns, in "Curriculum as Concern for Man's Temporality," Huebner focuses specifically on the need for educators to gain a basic awareness of both *temporality* and *historicity*. Huebner (1974) digs below the surface of the curriculum as currently conceived, *deconstructing* and "penetrating the realities that the everyday educator takes for granted," and illuminating, through a phenomenological approach in thought and language, the ways the "educator has decided to live in the world and what he sees as possible futures" (37). Huebner seeks out new and unique ways to think and speak poetically about the phenomenon of education, as opposed to merely being "socialized into the existing institutions or the language generated by them" (Ibid., 36).

It is not about educators merely finding or inventing new words, resorting to catch phrases, or producing new terms for antiquated educational theories. Instead, what is required is a radical reconceptualization of education from the ground up, and for Huebner, this involves educators awakening to the primordial power of "essential" language. Huebner, writing on language and teaching, speaks of the enduring nature of language and seeks to understand the *originary* naming power of language as it might relate to inspiring authentic reforms in education. Language is not the equivalent of expressing or verbalizing knowledge through propositions, it is not merely a system of codes, signs, symbols, and signifiers, rather in its essence, "language is neither expression nor an activity of man," for language in its authentic manifestation "speaks" through us in order to, by means of essential naming, bring the "presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness" (Heidegger, 1971, 197-198).

Indeed, this is how Huebner conceives language, which allows us to bring forth what is concealed into the open by naming the world. In tracing Huebner's curriculum philosophy back to its origin or source, in relating his language and concepts to a unique way of naming the truth of our historical Being as related to our educational practices, I have tried to demonstrate several ways in which educators might benefit from experiencing Huebner's critical encounter with Heidegger's philosophy. It is my hope that readers draw inspiration from a reconceived understanding of education as to feel empowered to reconsider the ways in which they view students and themselves in terms of their own potentiality-for-Being as grounded in their historical realities, which hold the potential of offering unique possibilities for educational reform, which for Huebner (1974), amounts to a concern for "transcendence, liberation, emancipation" (39).

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