The Philosophical Act of Seeing With One’s Own Eyes: The Silent Films of Stan Brakhage

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Susan Sontag warns of the dangers associated with critical interpretations of art that work off the mistaken notion that art is reducible to an accurate interpretation if ‘certain codes, certain “rules” of interpretation’ are applied and followed (Sontag 1966, 13). Herein, I seek to revisit the filmic art of Stan Brakhage through the lens of philosophy in a way that avoids this tendency toward reification in critique, acknowledging at the outset that the depth and complexity of Brakhage’s work makes it impossible to approach anything resembling a correct interpretation. For the capacity for these films to make meaning lies beyond the grasp of even the most deft and careful critic. Instead, what I am offering the reader is a constellation of interpretive gestures gathered around the central theme of philosophy as they emerge from the phenomenological tradition. I attempt to intimate several possible ways that these films might express their truth.

Sontag states that in most interpretations of art, the intellect takes revenge on art in the attempt to do the unthinkable, namely, render great art ‘manageable,’ because as she rightly attests, great works of art hold the power to ‘make us nervous’ (Sontag 1966, 12). This, I propose, is exactly what Brakhage’s films do - they shake us from our commonplace ways of seeing, understanding, and discoursing about the world, and accomplish this in a philosophical manner. His films work toward the recovery of the ‘bodily’ dimension of thought and return us to the original moments, liminal events, that mark out human becoming as we make the passage from the abyss, the void of absolute, impersonal Being, to a formal sense of conscious self-awareness. Brakhage, unlike any other filmmaker, captures and re-presents the precarious and uncertain nature of such acts defining human subjectivity, haunted as they are by the looming, foreboding presence of death, and does so, in great part, through the formal and stylistic choices he makes as a filmmaker and artist.

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2 Sontag calls for the movement away from hermeneutics, and the concern with rendering art’s content explicable and meaningful, toward a concern with describing art’s formal characteristics and qualities, i.e., cutting ‘back content so that we can see the thing’ in the quest to intuit ‘how it is what it is,’ and even ‘that it is what it is, rather than to show what it means,’ and for this reason suggests an ‘erotics of art’ in place of hermeneutics (ibid. 14). Indeed for Camus, this is the philosophical-artistic task of the absurd man, who is attuned to existence in such a way that he realizes that when giving creative (artistic) expression to a world ‘it is not a matter of explaining and solving, but of experiencing and describing’ (Camus 1983, 94).
3 In this essay I envision philosophy in a manner reminiscent of Heidegger’s rendering of metaphysics in 1929: ‘Metaphysics is a questioning in which we inquire into beings as a whole, and inquire in such a way that in doing so we ourselves, the questioners, are thereby also included in the question, placed into question’ (Heidegger 1995, 12-13/9).
On the Way to Philosophy Through Film

Berys Gaut states that we celebrate great works of art ‘for their profundity, their insight into the human condition, for how they make us see the world anew’ (Gaut 2006, 116). The qualities of great art that Gaut identifies are epitomized in Brakhage’s work, which is from the beginning related to and inseparable from a philosophical attitude toward existence, because his films emerge out of an authentic ‘existential’ mode of attunement, a mindset wherein the potential for human transcendence is framed and filmed within its intractable relationship to death, the most extreme possibility of non-existence. Brakhage not only views existence in a philosophical manner, beyond this, he engages in philosophical inquiry in a fundamental way through the medium of film. The films arise from and respond to what Karl Jaspers views as the ultimate source (arche) of philosophy, namely, ‘the will to authentic communication,’ which embraces ‘wonder leading to knowledge, doubt leading to certainty, forsakenness leading to the self’ (Jaspers 1954, 26). This amounts to the philosophical struggle to arrive at a sense of metaphysical coherence and existential familiarity: a knowing of and belonging to the world with others. This foregoing claim about the relationship between philosophy and Brakhage’s filmic art draws inspiration from Fred Camper who writes that while ‘the at-the-edge quality of his work may have been born out of his personal psychology, it ultimately becomes, particularly in his major films, a philosophical inquiry into the nature of existence’ (Camper 2003, 5).

Brakhage draws inspiration for his work in a manner that weaves philosophy and art together in a seamless relationship, in that he questions and contemplates existence with the acuity and sensitivity of an artist, attempting to come to some sort of philosophical understanding of the situation, and then attempts to recreate this insight or vision in the artistic medium of film, in doing so, the films live simultaneously on two levels: a personal, or particular level, and a universal (transcendental) level, in that they show or intimate something of the necessary and invariable foundations of the human condition. For example, in Brakhage’s epic, Dog Star Man (1961-1964), amidst the particularities of this woodcutter, this mountain, this seemingly insurmountable life-task, this particular struggle with dead wood, something of the universal emerges, and it might be expressed in terms of what Jaspers identifies as ‘fundamental situations,’ or existential-ontological situations, that can only be acknowledged and confronted, never changed or surmounted – and it is only in relation to these situations that human life holds the potential to become meaningful:

We are always in situations. Situations change, opportunities arise. If they are missed they never return. I myself can work to change the situation. But there are situations which remain essentially the same
even if their momentary aspect changes and their shattering force is obscured: I must die, I must suffer, I must struggle, I am subject to chance, I involve myself inexorably in guilt. We call these fundamental situations of our existence ultimate situations. (Jaspers 1954, 20)

The reconciliation of philosophy and art, which might be read as vengeance against Plato’s revenge on art, is something we prominently encounter in the German philosophical/aesthetic tradition, e.g., in Schopenhauer, who argues the following: ‘Not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom towards solving the problem of existence’ (Schopenhauer 1969, 406). Although they both share the same concern, namely, the search for meaning in human existence, the methodology and the manner in which they express their truths vary. Art is perceptual and philosophy is conceptual. This is the manner in which analytic philosophy views the issue. However, in the so-called ‘Continental tradition,’ in somewhat crude and reductive terms, those philosophers more concerned with Kant’s aesthetics and morals than his epistemology, there is a blurring of the lines between philosophy and art in such a way that conceptual knowledge and aesthetic understanding hold the potential to co-exist. The knowledge that we glean from art, by means of the aesthetic experience, which I will outline, is neither reducible to propositional knowledge or calculative knowledge, nor is it wholly devoid of cognitive content.

**Vision and Knowledge in Philosophy and the Filmic Aesthetics of Brakhage**

While a detailed analysis and defense of *cognitivism* in aesthetics as related specifically to the avant-garde is beyond the scope of this essay,⁴ there is a way in which to approach the issue of knowledge and art by examining what Brakhage states about the viewing of film. In the documentary *Brakhage on Film* (Arnold Gassan and Carlos Steegmiller, 1965), Brakhage

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⁴James Young makes the case that works of avant-garde art ‘contribute little to knowledge,’ and since works of the avant-garde have little epistemological, or cognitive value, they generally have little aesthetic value’ (Young 2001, 75). His position on art as a source of knowledge is grounded in a representational theory of art, and in brief, his claim is that any works of art wherein the content is not recognizable or discernable, does not contain a substantial cognitive content and hence value. Works of the avant-garde, especially those that are non-representational, depend on discourse, critical or otherwise, in order to have their meaning suggested, i.e., in a strict sense, knowledge cannot occur through the isolated experience of the spectator and work of art without the mediation of discourse, without which these works ‘cannot be understood and do not represent except in conjunction with what is said about them’ (Young 2001, 79). If we focus on the discussions surrounding the New York School of *abstract expressionism* and its ‘supposed’ dependence, for its classification and subsequent value as art, on the critical writings of both Greenberg and Rosenberg, Young’s point is elucidated. Clearly an entire essay could be devoted to the analysis and classification of Brakhage’s films in terms of Young’s theory of avant-garde art.
likens the experience of watching film to that of participating in a religious ‘ritual.’ In the writings of William James, on the variety of religious experience, the *noetic*, or knowledge-giving, aspect of such psychological experiences is highlighted as one of several defining aspects of religious, or spiritual, possession; namely, truth, which James likens to ‘illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance’ (James, 1923, 252).\(^5\) Heidegger, although renouncing the ‘psychology’ of the event, as he thinks in terms of fundamental modes of attunement, in his now-famous (or infamous) interpretation of the Greek temple as monumental work of art, also draws out the inner workings of what might be termed a religious-aesthetic-noetic experience for the Greeks who gathered at the great temple for worship, and who were, in an *ec-static* moment of aesthetic attunement, within the truth-happening of the artwork, transformed, transfigured in a communal occurrence. Through an act of consecration inspired by the work of art, as Heidegger contends, ‘the holy is opened up as holy and the god is invoked into the openness of his presence’ (Heidegger 1971, 43-44). Below, Brakhage articulates the unique form of knowledge that he envisions as belonging to the domain of film-as-art. We might understand that the pursuit of this type of aesthetic knowledge is not limited to the filmmaker and is shared by the viewers of his films:

I suggest, there is a pursuit of knowledge foreign to language and founded upon visual communication, demanding a development of the optical mind, and dependent upon perception in the original and deepest sense of the word. (Brakhage 2001, 12)

Two crucial points emerge from Brakhage’s statement as related to philosophy and the topic of aesthetic knowledge: First, the knowledge of which Brakhage speaks is analogous to the ancient Greek understanding of αἴσθησις (*aisthesis*), which is present to philosophical discussions from the Pre-Socratics through Plotinus, and generally represents the simultaneous act of perception-cum-intellection. It is a legitimate form of perceptual-emotional knowledge that is gleaned from works of art, and while it can be *poetised* — expressed through metaphor and symbol — it defies language in the sense that it differs in both form and content from empirical, axiomatic, and what we might term ‘propositional knowledge,’ and is described as an

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\(^5\) William James claims that rational states of consciousness are not the only way in which we gain knowledge of the world, and in addition, the knowledge we gain through mystical experiences has epistemological legitimacy. He argues that mystical states usually possess four marks that define them as such. The first two, however, as he states emphatically, are necessarily the defining components or characteristics of all mystical-religious experience: (1) *Ineffability* — A religious experience ‘defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words’ (i.e., through propositional discourse), and (2) *Noetic quality* — A religious experience provides ‘insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect.’ James goes on to add that (3) *Transiency* and (4) *Passivity*, while often times associated with religious experience, ‘are less sharply marked’ (ibid. 253).
immediate perceptual-noetic insight into whatever truth the artwork might inspire. Aesthetic knowledge, or understanding, is a legitimate form of world-disclosure, or movement into the truth as aletheuein (dis-closedness). Far from a difficult or spurious epistemological notion, this form of knowledge might be likened to what Nelson Goodman views as emotional-cognition, wherein our unique encounter with art adds to, deepens, and refines our understanding of the world in ways that would have been impossible without the encounter with the work of art. The artist, according to Goodman, ‘grasps fresh and significant relationships’ through her immersion in the world, and then ‘devises means for making them manifest,’ i.e., making them accessible to others within works of art, which function epistemologically in a unique manner (Goodman 1968, 32).

Secondly, Brakhage’s focus on vision and the understanding of what he terms the ‘optical mind,’ were both notions intimately familiar to the ancient Greeks. As Jean Pierre-Vernant relates, vision had a privileged status for the Greeks, and unlike the Cartesian admonition to turn from the senses into the isolated, interior world of the subject founded on elementary truths gleaned a priori by means of pure reason, in opposition to things seen, the Greeks viewed knowing as seeing,

to see and to know were one; if idein, “to see,” and eidenai, “to know,” are two verbal forms of the same term, eidos, “appearance, visible aspect,” also means “the specific character, the intelligible form,” this is because knowledge was interpreted and expressed through one’s way of seeing. (Vernant 1995, 16-17)

Vision set the Greeks within the world in a way that defies metaphysical dualism. Prior to any discourse in modern philosophical circles, the ancient Greek was a Being-in-the-world in the most intimate, visceral, and primordial sense of this notion: ‘To see and live were one in the same, and to be living, one had at the same time to see the light of the sun and to be visible to the eyes of all’ (Vernant 1995, 20). To leave the light of the sun signaled the loss of sight, the loss of knowledge, and the loss of Being, for to ‘leave and abandon the clarity of day was to delve into another world, that of Night’ (Vernant 1995, 12).

This is certainly not to indicate that the Greeks accepted prima facie that which came to presence before them, in fact they were well aware that phenomena tend toward dissembling and concealment, but this is not to invalidate the claim that vision located them within an authentic epistemological and metaphysical relationship with the world of their experience. However, Plato had a unique view of vision as it related to the real world, or realm of true Being, and this emerges through the non-naturalism and ontological dualism of his philosophy, wherein existence is divided into two distinct realms: (1) the physical world, which is visible and accessible through sense perception, always changing and deceptive, and (2)
the upper world of the forms (eidai), which are paradigms for the physical instantiation of entities. It is the case that for Plato, as he writes in the Phaedrus, the bodily (visual) experience of beauty captivates us through scintillating, sensuous appearance, and grants access to the immediacy of sensory appearances while simultaneously drawing us beyond the realm of the sensuous to the super-sensuous realm of the forms, where true Being resides at a remove from the lower realm of experience, which Plato literally classifies as me on, or ‘non-being.’ In Plato, there is an acute attention to vision as it is bound up with the occurrence of an aesthetic experience, but ultimately its value lies in its ability to facilitate the movement away from the type of embodied thinking that great art inspires, away from the sensuous context of the lived world of our experience wherein the life-blood of art pulses.

The sun for Plato, as described in The Republic, is the source of light, which represents the origin (arche) of vision, growth, and development, but it is not equated with any of these processes directly, and rather is a metaphor for the Form (eidos) of the Good, which is itself nothing experiential, but is the authentic source of goodness within the realm of the experiential. In other words, nothing would be capable of being defined as good in the sensate realm, if it did not participate in this Form, which is super-sensuous: ‘Light,’ as Emmanuel Levinas reasons, ‘whether it emanates from the sensible or from the intelligible sun, is since Plato said to be a condition for all beings’ (Levinas 1978, 47). This represents the erroneous belief prevalent in our thought today, namely, the epistemological predisposition to associate light and its illumination with truth. In addition to Levinas, both Heidegger and Derrida are critical of this modern Platonic-Cartesianism, which manifests in terms of the metaphysics of presence. As the logic runs, when things are revealed, they are brought into the clarifying light of truth, and when things are understood, they are possessed, as one might possess a present-at-hand object; they have been made manageable. ‘Light makes objects into a world,’ writes Levinas, ‘that is, makes them belong to us’ (ibid. 48). Thus, there is a propensity for truth to be understood in the following manner: truth is viewed as a form of possession, or ownership, and truth is then wielded as a scepter for control and domination. Foucault reminds us that we must be cautious about approaching truth in this manner. For within the relationship between knowledge (truth) and power, power depends for its effectiveness on knowledge with respect to those claiming possession of it, and knowledge engenders and legitimizes power.

The films of Brakhage radically subvert this philosophical tendency ingrained in the modern consciousness, for Brakhage’s art flies in the face of ‘our tendency to limit ourselves to settling on a single way of thinking, a single way of seeing, a single set of objects defined or possessed’ (Camper 2003, 9). For the illuminated images within his films, even when they are
not abstract, are certainly not representational in the classical, traditional sense of the cinema. In most instances they are recalcitrant to any efforts to concretize them in terms of the understanding, e.g., the shimmering images that are brilliantly bathed in the direct, reflected, and refracted light in *Commingled Containers* (1998), evade our comprehension and tend toward dissembling and illusion, or what the Greeks called *phantasia*, which refers to the appearance of things by way of the senses that manifest as *phantasma* - apparitions and visions. Brakhage may well be taking the viewer on an imaginative journey, but he refuses to grant us access to a transcendent world beyond the films, a superior, paradigmatic world of Platonic supersensuous truth, as if a real world beyond the immediate experience of the film existed. Brakhage also refuses to provide a vision of the world wherein it is rendered understandable, where it has been reified in knowledge. Brakhage’s films refuse to provide the viewer with ‘metaphysical solace,’ which is to say, these films fail to satisfy ‘man’s unconscious feeling in the face of his universe, [his] insistence upon familiarity and appetite for clarity, that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute’ (Camus 1983, 17).

The philosophical questions Brakhage asks, which give rise to the film in the first instance, always remain as questions, because he is asking original, or fundamental, questions, which are philosophical and of a dual-nature: they are transformative, they seek to reveal things that facilitate our development, and they at once inspire us toward the mode of preservation, they inspire the care and keeping of the basic question-worthy status of the things and issues his films address, such as love, existence, freedom, and human potential.

**The Return to Embodied Human Consciousness in the Films of Brakhage**

Prior to the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who ushered in a way to radically re-think our “bodily” connection to the world (the ‘body-subject’), Nietzsche, who might be considered a proto-existentialist, fought against the traditional notion of the single, hypostatized ego-subject and was already carving out a prominent place for the body in philosophy after it had been exiled in favor of the power of reason (mind) to think true Being at a remove from the experiential realm – namely, he was attempting to overturn Platonism: In place of Plato and the ‘two worlds’ of truth and seeming, he proposes one world, and in it he locates ‘the phenomenon of the body,’ which for Nietzsche is far ‘more fundamental than belief in the soul,’ because it is a ‘richer, clearer, more tangible phenomenon’ than either the belief in the soul or in the power of so-called ‘detached thought’ to accurately capture the depth and complexity of our existence (Nietzsche 1967, 270). Brakhage, in a radical manner, in an act of trans-valuating traditional cinematic values, sought to overturn the conventions of modern filmmaking. First, Brakhage rethinks the role of the spectator in terms of
participant, for his films ‘make uncompromising demands on the viewer to elicit and construct meaning,’ because Brakhage shifts the ‘attention from the author’s voice to the spectator’s eye’ (Rees 1999, 68-69). Secondly, Brakhage seeks to retune the senses of the cinemagoer by eliciting the body, in terms of consciousness as an embodied phenomenon, as the primary mode in which to experience his films, which includes, most importantly, re-teaching the spectator to see and feel again, as if for the first time. This is precisely what is called for in the mechanical age of reproduction, which might in part be inspired through sensitive art critique: the rediscovering and recovering of our senses and the meditative capacity of our Being as related to life and works of art.

Brakhage succeeds in getting us to see and feel more, but this phenomenon is not reducible to the incorporation of non-representational shapes and images, as in films such as Purgation (1987) and ‘existence is song’ [sic] (1987), which on the surface are abstract studies of color and light that challenge the eyes and the conscious sensibilities of those engaging the films. Brakhage also radically alters the cinematic experience of the spectator due to the unconventional manner in which he physically wields the camera to produce the types of shots incorporated into such films as Desistfilm (1954), Anticipation of the Night (1958), and Dog Star Man. For example, in Desistfilm the camera not only shakes in an unsteady fashion, it jerks rapidly, yet with a sense of purpose and precision, from one subject to another in the interior shots of the intoxicated youths. In Dog Star Man the camera whirls and spins in a manner that elicits an out-of-control, spiraling and dizzying effect, as Brakhage re-creates the woodcutter’s vision of the sky as viewed through the twisted, outstretched branches of the great trees that menacingly look down from above. In short, filming a movie for Brakhage was an intense, unadulterated bodily event, and often the result of hard and intensive physical labor on the part of the filmmaker. In Brakhage on Film, Brakhage is shown in the woods practicing various and quite radical techniques for filming with an empty camera, literally performing repetitive exercises in creative movement that closely resemble the beautiful and strange movements of modern dance, in order for these movements to become for him second-nature, as part of his organic bodily make-up. Listening to the interview, it becomes clear that for Brakhage, filmmaking is as much about the bones and sinew – the blood and sweat – of the artist as it is the capacity and capability to see and visualize in perceptive and imaginative ways.

In the documentary Brakhage (Jim Shedden, 1999), we encounter an interview where the filmmaker actually reverses the polarity, the traditional relationship, between eye and camera. While it is the case that Brakhage’s camera, which produces the film, retunes the vision of the spectator who is taught to see anew, it might just as well be said that Brakhage is training the camera to see and behave more like the human eye. He explains for both
interviewer and cameraman the very way in which the classic Hollywood pan-shot, where the camera moves smoothly from one side to the other, located firmly on a tri-pod, is completely unnatural and antithetic to the way in which our eyes really take in the environment, and states emphatically, ‘The eyes can’t see that way.’ Thus, as opposed to classic cinema, where in most cases the camera is most present when it is absent, or unobtrusive, in the films where Brakhage is not painting directly on the film-strips, there is a stark and bold obtrusive presence to the camera within the frames of the films. As indicated above, it is a living-camera that shakes, trembles, and darts to and fro with a sense of autonomous conviction in order to transcend the mechanical, the cold technological remove of the machine, and return it to the lived world of the filmmaker, as a physical and emotional extension of the person holding the camera, who views herself and world, through it, and in turn invites the spectator to dwell in this world as if he or she is viewing the world directly through the filmmaker’s third organic eye.

I think immediately of two such films that bespeak the situatedness of the human within the conscious world of its poetic making, as anchored within that world by the camera and overall vision of Brakhage, wherein its most primary mode of dwelling is undoubtedly linked to the optical organ: Window Water Baby Moving (1959) and The Act of Seeing with One’s Own Eyes (1971). Camper, commenting on The Act of Seeing with One's Own Eyes, alludes to the situatedness of Brakhage’s vision when describing the film as a ‘curious’ and ‘creepy,’ study of the ‘varieties of light reflected off of skin, with luminous fluids appearing to dance with the camera’ (Camper 2003, 7). These films, when viewed one after the other, represent a powerful philosophical womb-to-tomb meditation on the human condition, with all of its ecstatic moments of joy, elation, and sublime wonder along with the concomitant horrors, fear of the unknown, and the realization of the fragile and ephemeral nature of human existence, all revealed though a vision within which we participate, and are granted privileged access to, only through the act of seeing qua seeing. There is a fusion of worlds taking place as we experience these films: Our ‘lived world’ merges and participates in the visceral lived world of the film. We are in a quite literal sense present to the birth of the child, exploding with life and shimmering with liquid color, present in the morgue with all of its macabre, clinical sublimity, which is accentuated by the cold and calculating manner the medical examiner is probing, measuring, and examining the body prior to the incision. This film emanates a beautiful glowing reddish-orange hue in varying shades and tones, all of which transform the film into a contemporary filmic analogue to the grotesque, beautifully illummed paintings by Caravaggio, such as Judith Beheading Holofernes.

It is possible to relate the latter of these two films to the ontology of death as we find in early Heidegger. Were we to remain in the cold, sterile atmosphere of the morgue, amidst the lifeless forms, we would identify
death merely in biological terms, i.e., the cessation of the organs, thus viewing death in an inauthentic manner, as that phenomenon that happens to others, or as a quasi-established abstracted truth, which occurs at some distant point in the future. When understanding death in this manner, we are, according to Heidegger, ‘fleeing-in-the-face of death’ in terms of its ontological magnitude. For Heidegger, it is the mood (Stimmung) of anxiety (Angst) that puts us, through a process of existential solipsism (individuation), in touch with the ontological aspects of our Being, namely, our mortality (Heidegger 1962). It is possible to state that the aesthetic experience we have with Brakhage’s films attunes us in such a way that we might be free for the possibility of embracing death in terms other than the everyday understanding of it, wherein all of our possibilities are subordinated to the uttermost possibility of death, and thus become provisional in light of our finitude and mortality. In essence, when we embrace the ontological implications of death, there is an anticipation of death, an authentic comportment to death, which amounts to maintaining oneself within the imminent threat of death’s indefinite certainty at each and every moment of our existence. This ontological understanding hinges on the way that Brakhage’s film has framed the events for us, for while they contain the same content as would be consistent with a scientific documentary on autopsy, it is through the transfiguring lens of his filmic art that this world of the morgue is shown in philosophical terms wherein there is a play of and counter-striving between the ontic and ontological, and here I draw a linguistic-etymological analogue by imagining life depicted on the ‘slab’ in terms of what the Greeks called bios, the finite individuated life of this person, in its ontological relationship to the general potential and processes of life qua life as zoe, e.g., as associated with animated life in the philosophical hylozoism of the Pre-Socratics.

Clearly the concept of the ontological difference is present to modern existentialism and phenomenology, which generally unfolds through two phases: the phenomenological epoche (‘bracketing’) and the eidetic reduction. Within this two-fold process the philosopher, in a preparatory moment, suspends her judgment with respect to the phenomenon under investigation, this allows for a whole range of unique and previously overlooked dimensions of experience to manifest. The phenomenological method allows us to see things through a reconfigured lens where epistemological and psychological categories are held in abeyance and things appear non-contingent and independent of our subjective categorizations for defining and understanding them. This reveals insight into the essential and invariant structures (ontological-existential) that give form to our existence. We see, as it were, in the particular manifestation of phenomena what is essential, or universal, to all phenomena of a similar type, e.g., this method would allow us to intuitively glean the existence of fundamental ontological situations, which are
instantiated empirically, and within which we all find ourselves, such as those earlier introduced. This relates directly to what Camper writes about the process of readying oneself for the experience of Brakhage’s films, specifically the ‘openness’ and ‘attentiveness’ the viewer must cultivate in order to truly appreciate and benefit from the experience, and this includes the relaxed attitude of letting go of previously held conceptions, stripping oneself of prejudices about what film is or should be. Cleansing one’s conscious aesthetic palette, as it were, facilitates the mind-set required for the spectator to plumb ‘the depths of its imagery and the various themes and ideas suggested by its subject matter – imaginatively dancing with its flickering rhythms’ (Camper 2003, 4). This process allows for the manifestation of things never before imagined, which initially involves a sense of giving, or releasing, oneself over to these films, and in a resolute manner, becoming open to new truths, indeterminate truths, that are on the approach in a unique way from the film.

The Philosophical Experience of the Films: The Struggle for Self and World Amidst the Deafening Silence and Oppressive ‘Presence’ of Impersonal Being

In Brakhage on Film, the filmmaker states that he would prefer his 8mm films be experienced by the viewer in the comfort of her own home, wherein she can live with the images and meditate fully on them until they become familiar. In essence, the spectator creates the cinematic context within which the aesthetic experience occurs by reproducing the atmosphere of the cinema. This is precisely what Camper suggests that we must do when watching digital video reproductions of Brakhage’s original films. Much like Jean Goudal, who in ‘Surrealism and Cinema’ insists that the milieu of the darkened theatre is essential in recreating the dreamer’s habitat, which is crucial to inspiring the superior state of ‘surreal’ consciousness, Camper suggests a way in which to best ‘approximate the conditions of the cinema,’ because in order to fully experience Brakhage’s work it is ‘especially important not to view Brakhage films in the way most are accustomed to screening videos’ (Camper 2003, 4). The atmosphere, he suggests, is one that is dark, intimate, and devoid of distractions, and for the silent films, I argue this is most crucial. Viewing a film by Brakhage is best approached within a space that, proximally and for the most part, privileges vision and hearing, a context that accentuates our vision and hearing, facilitating them into the acuity of their full power. For not only do our eyes need to be re-trained, but the screening of the films also provides an opportunity to re-train our aural sensibilities: The silent films of Brakhage invite the return to our original ontological predisposition to hear – our originary auditory capacity that makes it possible to listen in anticipation of the truth of the art work, to listen, like the poet, for the call of the gods, to listen, as Heidegger insists, for the call of conscience, which awakens us to
our authentic potential for Being.

It is possible to draw an analogy between the silence of Brakhage’s films and the primordial silence of Being, which is something far more than merely the absence of sound. Below I reference Levinas’s description of the presence-in-absence of impersonal Being in terms of a ‘rumbling silence’ as related by Brakhage’s choice to screen many of his films in silence. The primordial silence of Being, states Levinas,

is something resembling what one hears when one puts an empty shell close to the ear, as if the emptiness were full, as if the silence were a noise. It is something one can also feel when one thinks that even if there were nothing, the fact that “there is” is undeniable. (Levinas 1982, 48)

This is precisely the experience of noise one hears and feels when viewing the silent films of Brakhage, and the aesthetic experience, along with the creation and enhancement thereof, is dependent in great part on the cinematic environment one has organized as described above. The incorporation of silence in Brakhage’s films is a crucial formal, stylistic, and aesthetic choice grounded in the quest to remain true to the purely visual aspect of film. In ‘The 60th Birthday Interview,’ Suranjan Ganguly asks Brakhage what he learned from his relationships with both Varese and Cage, and Brakhage offers the following: ‘Primarily what I got from them was the inspiration to make silent film’ (quoted in Ganguly 2002, 148). In the documentary Brakhage, filmmaker Phil Solomon speaks about the detrimental effect a sound track would have had on Brakhage’s films. ‘Brakhage,’ states Solomon, ‘developed a sophisticated visual aesthetic based primarily on rhythm, and if one puts a soundtrack on, you face the possibility of being redundant.’ The works, due to their visual rhythm created by the interplay of images and editing techniques, inspire a ‘mind’s eye soundtrack.’ Solomon reasons that ‘if the major concern of film is mainly visual, then the reason sound is a blind alley is that it cuts back sight,’ when film is silent, as Solomon suggests, ‘it becomes more possible to see.’

And, as I suggest, what we see (hear) and experience when viewing a Brakhage film is the foreboding presence-in-absence of what Levinas identifies as the ‘There is,’ or the ominous presence of impersonal Being. As opposed to the dreamer’s milieu of Surrealism, when experiencing a Brakhage film in the approximated conditions of the cinema, we might imagine the spectator transported to a time before temporality, prior to the formation of the subject conceived in hypostatic terms, which might be poetized as a pre-linguistic world of Being prior to any and all beings, entities, and consciousness itself. Levinas, philosophizing the ‘There is’ (il y a), or the ‘existing without existents,’ writes:
'There is,' in general, without it mattering what there is, without our being able to fix a substantive to this term. ‘There is’ is an impersonal form, like in it rains or it is warm. Its anonymity is essential. The mind does not find itself faced with an apprehended exterior […] The disappearance of all things and of the I leaves what cannot disappear, the sheer fact of Being in which one participates, whether one wants to or not, without having taken an initiative, anonymously. Being remains like a field of forces, like a heavy atmosphere belonging to no one. (Levinas 1978, 58)

It is possible to relate Levinas’s notion of impersonal Being in poetic, mythological terms to the great void of Chaos as conceived by the ancient Greeks.

Chaos is an emptiness, a dark emptiness where nothing is visible. A realm of falling, of vertigo and confusion - endless, bottomless. That void seizes us like the yawning of an immense gullet where everything is swallowed up by murky darkness. So at the start there is only that Void, a blind, black, boundless abyss. (Vernant 2001, 3)

This ‘blind, black, boundless abyss’ is as impenetrable as the darkness of night, and it is at night, during the darkest, blackest nocturnal hours that the ‘rumbling silence’ of impersonal Being is most powerfully heard and felt in the midst of its deafening silence. For Levinas’s notion of the ‘There is’ can be understood in terms of solitude and insomnia. In darkness we lack the power to see anything, but intuit the undeniable presence of ‘something’ – we hear it, we feel it. The night, as Levinas claims, induces horror in the child who is relegated to the haunting solitude of his room. When as a child, ‘one sleeps alone, the adults continue life; the child feels the silence of his bedroom as “rumbling”,’ and in such moments the ‘I’ is depersonalized, and this is also related to insomnia, for in this state of persistent wakefulness amid the night, ‘one can and one cannot say that there is a “I” which cannot manage to fall asleep. The impossibility of escaping wakefulness is something “objective,” independent of my initiative’ (Levinas 1982, 49). In this state I am absolutely dependent upon the night, or impersonal Being, in its persistence and threat. Yet this dependence is something that cannot be transcended as long as we strive to give form to our conscious world as subjects, as human beings, and accompanying this ontological truism is an overwhelming sense of horror and dread, for only in death is there an ‘absolute negation wherein the music ends’ (Levinas 1982, 48). However, as Levinas reasons, outside of this single fatality, ‘one has the impression of a total impossibility of escaping it, of stopping the music’ (Levinas 1982, 49).

The ‘There is’ is indistinguishable from the sound of silence heard amidst the silence. It is, as Levinas states, the ‘absolute emptiness that one
can imagine before creation,’ and from out of this black abyss the subject as ‘I’ emerges, which represents human existence in terms of the ‘the passage of going from being to a something’ (Levinas 1982, 51). In this process subjectivity, identity, and consciousness are de-centered, they are secondary to the primary condition of impersonal Being, which is always antecedent to human consciousness. This is why Levinas claims that prior to the ‘I am,’ ‘There is,’ and in thinking about what the passage from Being to being is like in relation to the films of Brakhage, we might imagine that life, the process of becoming an existent, is comprised of a succession of ‘liminal’ moments, wherein human beings work to stand-out (ec-static) from the anonymous context of Being. In these liminal moments, we bring forth consciousness through the poetic act of creation when language, as a symbolic response to the void brings a world, a life, to stand-out in bold relief from the shapeless mass that forever encompasses our existence, from out of which our subject-hood emerges and threatens to return in death. Consciousness, for Levinas, is the hypostatic act of establishing an identity as separated off from the ‘There is,’ and is, in many ways, the ephemeral attempt to escape Being. However, our human being, our subject-hood, is never given over by Being as a ‘gift,’ it is ‘never inherited but always won in the heat of struggle’ (Levinas 1978, 76). This struggle is the battle for a worldly existence, and it is at once the warring against the forces of impersonal Being and a personal battle in which we must assume the existential responsibility for choosing and laboring toward the end of becoming an existent. Levinas, unlike Heidegger, does not subscribe to the notion that we are thrown-into-the-world as Being-in-the-world, in terms of representing the primordial ontological notion that our Dasein is always

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6 Levinas, recounting the move beyond Existence and Existents, states the following: ‘My first idea was that perhaps a “being,” a “something” one could point at with a finger, corresponds to a mastery over the “there is” which dreads in being.’ Yet this does not amount to a permanent escape or salvation from the ‘There is,’ but rather there is an act of ‘deposition’ of the ego that takes place ‘in the social relationship with the Other,’ wherein one’s responsibility for and to the Other assumes primacy when orienting oneself to the oppressive threat of impersonal Being. Thus, as Levinas reasons, ‘being-for-the-other, seemed to me, as early as that time, to stop the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being,’ and ‘since that compelled my recognition and was clarified in my mind, I have hardly spoken again in my books of the “there is” for itself. But the shadow of the “there is,” and of nonsense, still appeared to me necessary as the very test of dis-inter-estedness’ (ibid. 51-52). As Robert John Sheffler Manning shows, if there exists an escape from the weight of Being, or the ‘There is’ (other than non-existence), it is to be found by following a ‘mysterious’ new path, which is linked to eros, a state wherein ‘there is a power capable of transporting the self beyond him/herself to the beloved who is other’ (Sheffler 1993, 53). It is in Levinas’s follow-up text to Existence and Existents, Time and the Other that he pursues and deepens this line of thought, presenting ‘the social relationship as a relation with a mystery, and it hints that perhaps the self can escape being by its relation to this mystery, the otherness of the Other’ (ibid. 57). For a more speculative discussion concerning the potential ‘contemporary’ implications of Levinás’s understanding of the social relationship and the Other see: Bernasconi, Robert and Critchley, Simon (1991) Re-Reading Levinas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
already located in the world. Rather, Levinas views our existence as a continued process of laboring in order belong to a world in the first instance, for the human is always at a ‘distance’ from both Being and the world. In short, winning a life, finding a home within the world amounts to engaging in a struggle with primordial forces that are indifferent to our condition: Life is labor.

It is possible to imagine such a life portrayed, or better, captured as lived by the filmmaker: The films of Brakhage document, as consecrated acts of subjectivity, the arduous process of resisting impersonal Being, wracked as it is with horror and dangers, by ceaselessly struggling to wrest our lives, our conscious existence and world from impersonal Being: We strive to give form and shape to our world, we work to define, redefine, and reconfigure our conscious existence while Being threatens at every turn to overwhelm even our most valiant efforts and engulf our consciousness, returning us to the black, shapeless void from whence we have struggled to emerge. Brakhage is not so much attempting to fully understanding Being, rather he is re-presenting the condition within which we find ourselves, i.e., he is not primarily concerned with ‘what’ Being is, rather ‘that’ it is, as a brute fact, and the richness in his work streams from his quest to examine through film the processes of ‘how’ we become truly as human beings, how and to what degree we are able to shoulder the weight of the responsibility that presses down upon us for making a life.

As articulated, life might be equated with the attempt to escape impersonal Being, and works of art, poetic acts of creation, state building, nation building are all testimonies to human consciousness attempting to resist Being, to stand out again the shapeless backdrop of the void of Being. These are all labor-intensive acts, which acquire meaning in the personal struggle against the ontological forces that are beyond us, and since we can never assimilate Being in knowledge it remains external, it is never made a possession. It is not difficult to see this theme played out in Dog Star Man, for it is possible to read the film is a testament to our laboring to establish a world in the face of Being wherein we experience the onset and onslaught of fatigue, the impending drive to halt or escape from the weight of our world-building activities. In moments of fatigue we seek to refuel and re-motivate, to somehow regain a semblance of strength to resist the urge to abandon the task and continue on in the ominous presence of the overwhelming weight of impersonal Being. For example, the woodcutter must always be reminded of his commitment to the task, and this comes through the experience of fatigue, wherein he is at once confronted by the unarticulated, implicit existential responsibility and necessity to carry on up the mountain and the concomitant desire to abandon the labor under the sheer weight of the task.

Brakhage, with deft sensitivity and imagination, re-produces the ontological difference between Being and beings in the films Stellar (1993),
Study in Color and Black and White (1993), and Black Ice (1994), for these films, while one might refer to them as light and color studies, are more aptly conceived in terms of the glaring absence of light. These films are dominated by the intrusion of Chaos and night on the subject’s conscious efforts to establish a terrestrial grounding amidst the groundless chasm of Being. In the film commentary for By Brakhage: An Anthology (2003), Brakhage remarks about Stellar that it is ‘a visual envisioning of outer space,’ and the void plays a dominant role in this film, for while brilliant, fleeting flashes of luminescent celestial forms emerge, are born, in a variety of brilliant hues, they just as quickly ‘burn out’ as they are extinguished and consumed by the abyss from out of which they arose. Black Ice is also a short film wherein light and color are threatened to be overtaken by the black of night, and the zooming effect produces the feeling in the spectator, not so much that the film is rushing toward her, but rather that she is falling into the realm of impersonal Being, ‘the realm of falling, of vertigo and confusion,’ as described by Vernant, and losing both her footing on the shifting foundations of her world along with her grip on consciousness amidst the onslaught of Being. Both of these films might be read as reminders that the formation of subject-hood is an act that always teeters on the brink of disaster, for the danger is ever-present that the ‘void seizes us like the yawning of an immense gullet where everything is swallowed up by murky darkness’ (Vernant 2001, 3).

Perhaps the film that most eloquently poetises the overwhelming power, weight, and presence of the void of Being is Study in Color and Black and White. The dominance of black in the frames obtrusively plays a crucial role thematically and not just visually, for not only does it function as a stark contrast to the brightly lit shapes, setting the vibrant colors aglow, it also gives the tangible sense that darkness, night, and impersonal Being threatens every second of the film to envelope and eclipse the light once and for all. This indicates that our existence, much like the films of Brakhage, as Levinas writes, unfolds in the ‘dread before Being,’ in terms of ‘an impotent recoil, an evasion’ from the haunting ‘shadow of the “There is”’ (Levinas 1982, 51). In line with this theme, Brakhage ingeniously incorporates the use of what might be termed the ‘cinematic caesura,’ as in the film existence is song within The Dante Quartet (1987), which as opposed to merely representing, through the incorporation of several pure black frames, a pause delineating a rhythmic division in the films, as related to what has been stated about Levinas, Brakhage has them function in an ontological manner, reminding the spectator of the precarious nature of our being and our constant dependence on and the intractable relationship with the primordial void of Being that is inescapable. The radical contrast Brakhage sets up between light and dark, between radiant color and black, or the complete absence of light, functions beyond a mere technique related to aesthetic composition. When describing the films I have chosen to analyse,
one might well replace the phrase, *interplay of light and dark within a context of symmetrical and asymmetrical juxtaposition*, with the observation that their interaction is violent and resembles, more often than not, a life and death struggle for superiority, which threatens to break beyond the horizon of film’s frame.

To aptly conclude reflections on this theme I examine *Eye Myth* (1967), a hand-painted and etched (scratched) short film that grows out of the above philosophical notion of the ‘There is,’ i.e., that we are, from the moment we are conscious, precariously poised on the precipice of relinquishing our consciousness to the forces of night, of Being. This film portrays a man, immersed inextricably within the struggle with Being amidst the electrically charged onslaught of sensory stimuli. Brakhage brilliantly recreates the phenomenon through the furious activity of light and color raining down on the protagonist, as if to assault him, as he desperately labors to give form and meaning to his world in a fleeing, and heroic, attempt to stand-out from the shapeless chasm of the ‘There is,’ which is represented as an ‘alien’ force which ‘strikes’ out at the man (Levinas 1982, 51). The film is grounded in the distinct and unifying notion that Being forever defies human comprehension and refuses to be assimilated, made the ‘same’ by us, ‘totalized’ in knowledge, and thus remains as radically Other. As the film poetizes, our lives are a continued, ever-renewed process of wrestling beings and our being from the abyss of impersonal Being with the accompanying understanding that those things brought to the light of truth, to the level of personal consciousness, always hold the propensity to sink back into the black void of primordial Being. In the span of 9-seconds, Brakhage manages to philosophically re-present the protagonist’s ontological condemnation to life in terms of the continued process of self-formation, deformation, and reformation, all the while haunted by the foreboding sense of danger of primordial darkness that threatens to overtake all of his endeavors, throwing the fleeting moments of existential clarity into confusion as he is overwhelmed by the sheer force of the oblivion.

The films I have analyzed in the final section all re-produce the human life-task in terms of the perennial passage from *Being to something*, from *Being to being*. Brakhage’s films capture the extreme uncertainty bound up with this life-task, with its propensity toward disaster and abject failure, which are experienced in moments when we are horrified and humbled before the sublime weight and mystery of Being. To return to what was stated at the outset, philosophically speaking, through questioning and contemplating the problems of existence, Brakhage gleans the insight to re-create and re-produce his ‘philosophical’ vision of things in the artistic medium of film, and what he intimates is the understanding of both the *transcendental* conditions structuring all human experience as well the *transcendent* nature of the human being, i.e., the human’s ability to stand outside or beyond both itself and Being. This latter notion is intimately
linked with the ability of the human being to project itself into the future as something that is ‘not-yet’ actualized, an ability that is distinctly human, and in this projection creatively imagine a ‘self’ that is ‘not-yet’ fulfilled or actualized, but is ‘no-longer’ identical with the self in its present instantiation. For in the moment of futural projection, we are simultaneously willing something new and unique, something that has not yet arrived and is still on the approach, and decidedly rejecting aspects our present state of existence that we seek to move beyond, to change, to transcend.

In a universe that is devoid of intrinsic meaning, in a world that continually resists our most concerted and organized efforts to understand it or justify it in religious, scientific, or moral terms, Brakhage’s films testify, in a manner reminiscent of Nietzsche, that it is perhaps only as an ‘aesthetic phenomenon,’ a phenomenon of art, that the world might be justified, or perhaps, more appropriately, rendered beautiful and meaningful – and Brakhage found his world both intensely beautiful and meaningful. However, as alluring and beautiful as Brakhage’s aesthetics may be, they are also intensely strange and frightening, this because their beauty is inseparable from the grave and disturbing circumstances that gave rise to his art, and below, Camper captures this notion when describing the thrust of Brakhage’s filmmaking in the following terms:

[H]is project was always to explore the richness of seeing and of life in its totality, accepting no givens about what seeing, or the film image, or life itself is, but always pushing toward the unknown [...] His films are made with an intensity, a kind of ‘wits end’ desperation, that suggests a consciousness on the brink. Brakhage was not only a craftsman doing something he loved; he used his craft to try to come to an understanding of whether – and on what terms – he could continue to go on living. (Camper 2003)
This ‘project,’ as I have attempted to show, was ultimately embodied and expressed within Brakhage’s pursuit of art as it was grounded in legitimate philosophical inquiry, which dealt seriously with philosophical issues through the medium of filmic aesthetics. As Brakhage reminds us, the human is complex. However, ‘philosophy need not be high flown, it is enough to dwell on what lies close and immediate in the here and now’ (Heidegger 1966, 52). Anyone can follow the path of meditative thought, thinking in her own way, within her own limits, and through his films Brakhage wanted to make us aware that ‘each of us can become an inner explorer, continually pushing toward some new frontier of consciousness’ (Camper 2003, 9). I have always viewed philosophy as a form of creative problem solving, but perhaps a better definition would refer philosophy to a form of thinking that is never truly at an end, never completed. While its scope is grand and its issues many and varied, philosophy most often finds its subject matter, its place and home-ground, within the immediate realm of our day-to-day lives. Much like Brakhage, it is possible to think seriously and philosophically about such things as this patch of earth, this present time in history, this life with family and friends, and all of these things, it might be said, viewed through the eyes and lens of the filmmaker, served as artistic inspiration, which rooted him philosophically in the world.

Brakhage’s films force us to consider a crucial aspect of philosophy that is often overlooked, namely, we often consider philosophy a discipline that seeks to ‘solve’ the problems of existence, and what is glossed in this understanding is that prior to any move to solve problems, philosophy must first seek a proper understanding of the issues, which often entails a reformulation of the initial questions that we ask, which amounts to an inquiry into the questions themselves in order to clarify the manner in which to best approach the problems in the first instance. If the films of Brakhage are philosophical queries in celluloid, as I have attempted to show, then they...
denote the *on-the-wayness* of philosophy, the incompleteness of all philosophical thought. However, this is not a weakness in or critique of philosophy, this simply demonstrates the intractable nature of the things philosophy deals with, and one can view this as problematic or, as did Brakhage, through the attunement of ‘wonder’ (*thauma*), wherein the world is revealed in such a way that our existence, although never fully explained or justified, shot through as it is with a preponderance of profuse and intense pain and suffering, also holds the ‘possibility of deep satisfaction and indeed, in exalted moments, of perfection’ (Jaspers 1954, 17). Brakhage’s films undoubtedly give us many of these co-called ‘exalted moments of perfection,’ and to apprehend this reality, and put this reality in question with the courage, sensitivity, and aesthetic acuity of Brakhage, amounts to grasping what Jaspers calls the ‘the aim of the philosophical endeavor’ (Jaspers 1954, 17).
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